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ABSTRACT
How much discretion should the monetary authority have in setting its policy? This question is analyzed in an
economy with an agreed-upon social welfare function that depends on the randomly ﬂuctuating state of the
economy. The monetary authority has private information about that state. In the model, well-designed rules
trade oﬀ society’s desire to give the monetary authority discretion to react to its private information against
society’s need to guard against the time inconsistency problem arising from the temptation to stimulate the
economy with unexpected inﬂation. Although this dynamic mechanism design problem seems complex, soci-
ety can implement the optimal policy simply by legislating an inﬂation cap that speciﬁes the highest allowable
inﬂation rate. The more severe the time inconsistency problem and the less important is private information,
the smaller is the optimal degree of discretion. As either the time inconsistency problem becomes suﬃciently
severe or private information becomes suﬃciently unimportant, the optimal degree of discretion is none.
∗The authors thank the editor and the referees for very useful comments, Kathy Rolfe for excellent editorial assistance,
and the NSF for generous assistance. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Suppose that society can credibly impose on the monetary authority rules governing the
conduct of monetary policy. How much discretion should be left to the monetary authority in setting
its policy? The conventional wisdom from policymakers is that optimal outcomes can be achieved
only if some discretion is left in the hands of the monetary authority. Starting with Kydland and
Prescott (1977), most of the academic literature has contradicted that view. In summarizing this
literature, Taylor (1983) and Canzoneri (1985) argue that when the monetary authority does not
have private information about the state of the economy, the debate is settled: there should be no
discretion; that is, the best outcomes can be achieved by rules that specify the action of the monetary
authority as a function of observables. The unsettled question in this debate is Canzoneri’s: What
about when the monetary authority does have private information? What, then, is the optimal
degree of monetary policy discretion?
To answer this question, we use a model of monetary policy similar to that of Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). In our legislative approach to monetary policy
we suppose that society designs the optimal rules governing the conduct of monetary policy by the
monetary authority. The model includes an agreed-upon social welfare function that depends on the
random state of the economy. We begin with the assumption that the monetary authority observes
the state and individual agents do not. In the context of our model, we say that the monetary
authority has discretion if its policy is allowed to vary with its private information.1
The assumption of private information creates a tension between discretion and time incon-
sistency.2 Tight constraints on discretion mitigate the time inconsistency problem in which the
monetary authority is tempted to claim repeatedly that the current state of the economy justiﬁes a
monetary stimulus to output. However, tight constraints leave little room for the monetary author-
ity to ﬁne tune its policy to its private information. Loose constraints allow the monetary authority
to do that ﬁne tuning, but they also allow more room for the monetary authority to stimulate the
economy with a surprise inﬂation. These constraints may vary with publicly observed variables, but
the relevant question is, how tight should they be? How much discretion should be allowed?
Our purpose here is to answer this question by ﬁnding the constraints on monetary policy
1Our approach here is diﬀerent from that in the early literature on rules vs. discretion, as is our notion of discretion.
In the early literature it is assumed that society has no mechanism for commiting to rules governing monetary policy.
As does Taylor (1983), we ﬁnd the legislative approach appealing for advanced economies.
2For some potential empirical support for the idea that the Federal Reserve possesses some nontrivial private
information, see the work of Romer and Romer (2000). As we discuss below, we interpret this private information in
our economy along the lines of Sleet and Yeltekin (2003) and Sleet (forthcoming).that, in the presence of private information, optimally resolve the tension between discretion and
time inconsistency. Formally, we cast this problem as a dynamic mechanism design problem. Can-
zoneri (1985) conjectures that because of the dynamic nature of the problem, the resulting optimal
social contract with regard to monetary policy is likely to be quite complex. We ﬁnd that, in fact,
it is quite simple. For a broad class of economies, the optimal social contract is static and can be
implemented by setting an inﬂation cap, an upper limit on the permitted inﬂation rate.
More formally, our model can be described as follows. Each period, the monetary authority
observes one of a continuum of possible privately observed states of the economy. These states
are i.i.d. over time. In terms of current payoﬀs, the monetary authority prefers to choose higher
inﬂa t i o nw h e nh i g h e rv a l u e so ft h i ss t a t ea r er e a l i z e da n dl o w e ri n ﬂation when lower values are
realized. Here a mechanism speciﬁe sw h a tm o n e t a r yp o l i c yi sc h o s e ne a c hp e r i o da saf u n c t i o no f
the history of the monetary authority’s reports of its private information. We say that a mechanism
is static if policies depend only on the current report by the monetary authority and dynamic if
policies depend also on the history of past reports.
Our main technical result is that, as long as a monotone hazard condition is satisﬁed, the
optimal mechanism is static. We also give examples in which this monotone hazard condition fails
and the optimal mechanism is dynamic.
We then show that our result on the optimality of a static mechanism implies that the optimal
policy has one of two forms: either it has bounded discretion, or it has no discretion. Under bounded
discretion, there is a cutoﬀ state: for any state less than this, the monetary authority chooses its
static best response, w h i c hi sa ni n ﬂation rate that increases with the state, and for any state greater
than this cutoﬀ state, the monetary authority chooses a constant inﬂation rate. Under no discretion,
the monetary authority chooses some constant inﬂation rate regardless of its information.
We then show that we can implement the optimal policy as a repeated static equilibrium
of a game in which the monetary authority chooses its policy subject to an inﬂation cap and in
which individual agents’ expectations of future inﬂation do not vary with the monetary authority’s
policy choice. In general, the inﬂa t i o nc a pw o u l dv a r yw i t ho b s e r v a b l es t a t e s ,b u tt ok e e pt h em o d e l
simple, we abstract from observable states, and the inﬂation cap is a single number. Depending on
the realization of the private information, sometimes the cap will bind, and sometimes it will not.
These results imply that the optimal constraints on discretion take the form of an inﬂation
cap. The monetary authority is allowed to choose any inﬂation rate below this cap but is constrained
2from choosing an inﬂation rate above it. We say that a given inﬂation cap implies less discretion
than another cap if it is more likely to bind. We show that the more severe the time inconsistency
problem, the smaller is the optimal degree of discretion. Likewise, we show that the less important
is private information, the smaller is the optimal degree of discretion. It is immediate that we
can equivalently implement the optimal policy by choosing ranges on acceptable inﬂation rates.
These ranges will decrease as the time inconsistency problem becomes more severe relative to the
importance of private information.
Here the rationale for discretion depends in a critical way on the monetary authority having
some private information that the other agents in the economy do not have. Of course, if the
amount of such private information is thought to be very small in actual economies, relative to time
inconsistency problems, then our work argues that in such economies the logical case for a sizable
amount of discretion is weak, and the monetary authority should follow a rather tightly speciﬁed
rule.
One interpretation of our work is that we solve for the optimal inﬂation targets. As such,
our work is related to the burgeoning literature on inﬂation targeting. (See the work of Cukierman
and Meltzer (1986), Bernanke and Woodford (1997), and Faust and Svensson (2001), among many
others.) In terms of the practical application of inﬂation targets, Bernanke and Mishkin (1997)
discuss how inﬂation targets often take the form of ranges or limits on acceptable inﬂation rates
similar to the ranges that we derive. Indeed, our work here provides one theoretical rationale for
the type of constrained discretion advocated by Bernanke and Mishkin.
Here we have assumed that the monetary authority maximizes the welfare of society. As
such, the monetary authority is viewed as the conduit through which society exercises its will. An
alternative approach is to view the monetary authority as an individual or an organization motivated
by concerns other than that of society’s well-being. If, for example, the monetary authority is
m o t i v a t e di np a r tb yi t so w nw a g e s ,t h e n ,a sW a l s h( 1 9 9 5 )h a ss h o w n ,i ti sp o s s i b l et oi m p l e m e n t
the full-information, full-commitment solution. Hence, with such a setup, there are no binding
incentive problems in monetary policy to begin with. As Persson and Tabellini (1993) note, there
are a host of reasons such contracts are either diﬃcult or impossible to implement, and the main
issue for research following this approach is why such contracts are, at best, rarely used.
Our work is related to several literatures. It is related to some work on private information
in monetary policy games. (See, for example, that of Backus and Driﬃll (1985); Ireland (2000); Da
3Costa and Werning (2001); Sleet (2001); Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2003); Sleet and Yeltekin
(2003); and Stokey (2003).) The most closely related of these is the work of Sleet (2001), who
considers a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the monetary authority sees a noisy signal
about future productivity before it sets the money growth rate. Sleet ﬁnds that, depending on
parameters, the optimal mechanism may be static, as we ﬁnd here, or it may be dynamic.
Our work is also related to a large literature on dynamic contracting. Our result on the
optimality of a static mechanism is quite diﬀerent from what is typically found in this literature,
namely, that static mechanisms are not optimal. (See, for example, Green (1987), Atkeson and
Lucas (1992), and Kocherlakota (1996).) We discuss the relation between our work and both of
these literatures in more detail after we present our results.
At a technical level, we draw heavily on the literature on recursive approaches to dynamic
games. We use the technique of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), which has been applied to
monetary policy games by Chang (1998) and is related to the policy games studied by Phelan and
Stacchetti (2001), Albanesi and Sleet (2002), and Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano (2003).
The mechanism design problem that we study, at an abstract level, is related to some work
on supporting collusive outcomes in cartels by Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004), work on
risk-sharing with nonpecuniary penalties for default by Rampini (2003), and work on the tradeoﬀ
between ﬂexibility and commitment in savings plans for consumers with hyperbolic discounting by
Amador, Angeletos, and Werning (2003). Our paper is both substantively and technically quite
diﬀerent from these papers. We discuss the details of the relation after we present our results.
1. The Economy
A. The Model
Here we describe our simple model of monetary policy. The economy has a monetary au-
thority and a continuum of individual agents. The time horizon is inﬁnite, with periods indexed
t =0 ,1,....
At the beginning of each period, agents choose individual action zt from some compact set.
We interpret z as (the growth rate of) an individual’s nominal wage and let xt denote the (growth
of the) average nominal wage. Next, the monetary authority observes the current realization of its
private information about the state of the economy. This private information θt is an i.i.d., mean
0 random variable with support θ ∈ [θ,¯ θ], with a strictly positive density p(θ) and a distribution
function P(θ). Given this private information, the monetary authority chooses money growth µt in
4some large compact set [µ, ¯ µ].
The monetary authority maximizes a social welfare function R(xt,µ t,θt) that depends on
the average nominal wage xt, the monetary growth rate µt, and a privately observed shock θt.W e
interpret θt to be private information of the monetary authority regarding the impact of a monetary
stimulus on social welfare in the current period. Throughout, we assume that R is strictly concave
in µ and twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
A leading interpretation of the private information in our economy follows that of Sleet
and Yeltekin (2003) and Sleet (forthcoming). Individual consumers in the economy have either
heterogeneous preferences or heterogeneous information regarding the optimal inﬂation rate and the
monetary authority sees an aggregate of that information that the private consumers do not observe.
(Informally, we imagine that this private information takes resources to acquire, so that while agents
in the economy feasibly can acquire this information, the costs involved in doing so outweigh the
beneﬁts.) When we pose our optimal policy problem as a mechanism design problem, we are
presuming that the mechanism designer is a separate agent that has no independent information
of its own. We interpret the society’s objective as a weighted average of the preferences of the
heterogeneous consumers.





(U + xt − µt)2 +( µt − αθt)2
i
. (1)
We interpret (1) as the reduced form that results from a monetary authority which maximizes
a social welfare function that depends on unemployment, inﬂation, and the monetary authority’s
private information θ.E a c hp e r i o d ,i n ﬂation πt is equal to the money growth rate µt chosen by the
monetary authority. Unemployment is determined by a Phillips curve. The unemployment rate is
given by
ut = U + xt − µt (2)
where U is a positive constant, which we interpret as the natural rate of unemployment. Social
welfare in period t is a function of ut and πt and the shock θt. Our benchmark example is derived









similar to that used by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). Using (2) and
πt = µt in (3), we obtain (1). Here the monetary authority’s private information is about the social
5cost of inﬂation, but we develop our model for general speciﬁcations of the social welfare function
R(xt,µ t,θ t) which subsume (1) as a special case. Notice that in our general formulation we allow
for the current payoﬀ to vary with expected inﬂation, through xt;a c t u a li n ﬂation, through µt;a n d
the state θt. This formulation thus subsumes many other versions of the Kydland-Prescott and
Barro-Gordon models in the literature.3
Throughout, a policy for the monetary authority in any given period, denoted µ(·), speciﬁes
the money growth rate µ(θ) for each level of the shock θ. For any x, we deﬁne the static best response




Rx(x,µ(θ),θ)p(θ) dθ < 0. (4)
B. Two Ramsey Benchmarks
Before we analyze the economy in which the monetary authority has private information, it
is useful to consider two alternative economies. We think of the optimal policies in these economies
as benchmarks for that in the private information economy.
One benchmark, the Ramsey policy,d e n o t e dµR(·), yields the highest payoﬀ that can be
achieved in an economy with full information. The gap between that Ramsey payoﬀ and the payoﬀ
in the economy with private information measures the welfare loss due to private information.
The other benchmark, the expected Ramsey policy,d e n o t e dµER, is the optimal policy when
the policy is restricted to not depend on private information. In our environment, there is no publicly
observed shock to the economy; hence, this policy is a constant. The expected Ramsey policy is a
useful benchmark because it is the best policy that can be achieved by a rule which speciﬁes policies
as a function only of observables. This policy is analogous to the strict targeting rule discussed by
Canzoneri (1985).
For the Ramsey policy benchmark, consider an economy with full information with the fol-
lowing timing scheme. Before the shock θ is realized, the monetary authority commits to a schedule
for money growth rates µ(·). Next, individual agents choose their nominal wages z with associ-
ated average nominal wages x. Then the state θ is realized and the money growth rate µ(θ) is
3Note that the inﬂation rate that enters the period t social welfare function is the current inﬂation rate, that from
period t − 1 to period t. As noted by a number of authors, this formulation captures the distortions in a sticky price
model with multiple sectors. As the current inﬂation rate rises or falls, the prices of goods in sectors that can currently
change prices rise or fall relative to the prices in sectors that cannot. Movements in the current inﬂation rate thus
create resource allocation distortions.
Also, for simplicity, our formulation abstracts from direct costs due to future inﬂation. One interpretation of this
feature is that it captures what happens in the cashless limit of a sticky price model.





subject to x =
R
µ(θ)p(θ) dθ. For our example (1), the Ramsey policy is µR(θ)=αθ/2. Note that
the Ramsey policy has the monetary authority choosing a money growth rate which is increasing in
its private information. Thus, with full information, it is optimal to have the monetary authority
ﬁne tune its policy to the state. This feature of the environment leads to a tension in the economy
with private information between allowing the monetary authority discretion for ﬁne tuning and
experiencing the resulting time inconsistency problems.
For the other benchmark, consider an economy in which the monetary authority is restricted
to choosing money growth µ that does not vary with its private information. The equilibrium





subject to x = µ. For our example (1), the expected Ramsey policy is µER =0 .
For our example (1), the Ramsey policy obviously yields strictly higher welfare than does the
expected Ramsey policy. More generally, when Rµθ(x,µ,θ) > 0, the Ramsey policy µR(·) is strictly
increasing in θ and yields strictly higher welfare than does the expected Ramsey policy.
C. The Dynamic Mechanism Design Problem
To analyze the problem of ﬁnding the optimal degree of discretion, we use the tools of dynamic
mechanism design. Without loss of generality, we formulate the problem as a direct revelation game.
In this problem, society speciﬁes a monetary policy, the money growth rate as a function of the
history of the monetary authority’s reports of its private information. Given the speciﬁed monetary
policy, the monetary authority chooses a strategy for reporting its private information. Individual
agents choose their wages as functions of the history of reports of the monetary authority.
A monetary policy in this environment is a sequence of functions
n
µt(ht,ˆ θt)| all ht, ˆ θt
o∞
t=0
,w h e r eµt(ht,ˆ θt) speciﬁes the money growth rate that will be chosen in
period t following the history ht =( ˆ θ0,ˆ θ1,...,ˆ θt−1) of past reports together with the current report
ˆ θt. The monetary authority chooses a reporting strategy {mt(ht,θ t)| all ht, θt}∞
t=0 in period 0, where
θt is the current realization of private information and mt(ht,θ t) ∈ [θ,¯ θ] is the reported private in-
formation in t. As is standard, we restrict attention to public strategies, those that depend only
7on public histories and the current private information, not on the history of private information.4
Also, from the Revelation Principle, we need only restrict attention to truth-telling equilibria in
which mt(ht,θt)=θt for all ht and θt.
In each period, each agent chooses the action zt as a function of the history of reports ht.
Since agents are competitive, the history need not include either agents’ individual past actions or
the aggregate of their past actions.5
Each agent chooses nominal wage growth equal to expected inﬂation. For each history ht,




where we have used the fact that agents expect the monetary authority to report truthfully, so that
mt(ht,θt)=θt. Aggregate wages are deﬁned by xt(ht)=zt(ht).





βtR(xt(ht),µ t(ht,θt),θ t)p(θt) dθt (7)
where the future histories ht are recursively generated from the choice of monetary policy µt(·,·) in
the natural way, starting from the null history. The term 1 − β normalizes the discounted payoﬀs
to be in the same units as the per-period payoﬀs.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this revelation game is a monetary policy, a reporting
strategy, a strategy for wage-setting by agents {zt(·)}
∞
t=0 , and average wages {xt (·)}
∞
t=0 such that
(6) is satisﬁed in every period following every history ht, average wages equal individual wages in
that xt(ht)=zt(ht), and the monetary policy is incentive-compatible in the standard sense that, in
every period, following every history ht and realization of the private information θt, the monetary
authority prefers to report mt(ht,θt)=θt rather than any other value ˆ θ ∈ [θ,¯ θ]. Note that since
average wages xt(ht) always equal wages of individual agents zt(ht), we need only record average
wages from now on.
Note that this deﬁnition of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium includes no notion of optimal-
ity for society. Instead, it simply requires that in response to a given monetary policy, private
agents respond optimally and truth-telling for the monetary authority is incentive-compatible. The
4For a discussion of the large class of environments for which this restriction does not alter the set of equilibrium
payoﬀs, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
5For details of why this is true, see the work of Chari and Kehoe (1990).
8set of perfect Bayesian equilibria outcomes are the set of incentive-compatible outcomes that are
implementable by some monetary policy.
The mechanism design problem is to choose a monetary policy, a reporting strategy, and
a strategy for average wages, the outcomes of which maximize social welfare (7) subject to the
constraint that these strategies are incentive-compatible.
D. A Recursive Formulation
Here we formulate the problem of characterizing the solution to this mechanism design prob-
lem recursively. The repeated nature of the model implies that the set of incentive-compatible
payoﬀs that can be obtained from any period t on is the same that can be obtained from period 0.
Thus, the payoﬀ to any incentive-compatible outcome for the repeated game can be broken down
into payoﬀs from current actions for the players and continuation payoﬀs that are themselves drawn
from the set of incentive-compatible payoﬀs. Following this logic, Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti
(1990) show that the set of incentive-compatible payoﬀs can be found using a recursive method that
we exploit here.
In our environment, this recursive method is as follows. Consider an operator on sets of the
following form. Let W be some compact subset of the real line, and let ¯ w be the largest element of
W.T h es e tW may be interpreted as a candidate set of incentive-compatible levels of social welfare.
In our recursive formulation, the current actions are average wages x and a report ˆ θ = m(θ) for
every realized value of the state θ. For each possible report ˆ θ, there is a corresponding continuation
payoﬀ w(ˆ θ) that represents the discounted utility for the monetary authority from next period on.
Clearly, these continuation payoﬀsc a n n o tv a r yd i r e c t l yw i t ht h ep r i v a t e l yo b s e r v e ds t a t eθ.
We say that the actions x and µ(·) and the continuation payoﬀ w(·) are enforceable by W if




and the incentive constraints
(1 − β)R(x,µ(θ),θ) + βw(θ) ≥ (1 − β)R(x,µ(ˆ θ),θ) + βw(ˆ θ) (10)
are satisﬁed for all θ and all ˆ θ, where µ(θ) ∈ [µ, ¯ µ]. Constraint (8) requires that each continuation
payoﬀ w(ˆ θ) be drawn from the candidate set of incentive-compatible payoﬀs W, while constraint (9)
9requires that average wages equal expected inﬂation. Constraint (10) requires that for each privately
observed state θ, the monetary authority prefer to report the truth θ rather than any other message
ˆ θ. That is, the monetary authority prefers the money growth rate µ(θ) and the continuation value
w(θ) rather than a money growth rate µ(ˆ θ) and its corresponding continuation value w(ˆ θ).
The payoﬀ corresponding to x,µ(·), and w(·) is
V(x,µ(·),w(·)) =
Z £
(1 − β)R(x,µ(θ),θ) + βw(θ)
¤
p(θ) dθ. (11)
Deﬁne the operator T that maps a set of payoﬀs W i n t oan e ws e to fp a y o ﬀs
T(W)={v | there exist xv,µ v(·),w v(·) enforceable by W (12)
s.t. v = V(xv,µ v(·),w v(·))}.
As demonstrated by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), the set of incentive-compatible payoﬀs
is the largest set W that is a ﬁxed point of this operator:
W∗ = T(W∗). (13)
For any given candidate set of incentive-compatible payoﬀs W, we are interested in ﬁnding
the largest payoﬀ that is enforceable by W, or the largest element ¯ v ∈ T(W). We ﬁnd this payoﬀ by
solving the following problem, termed the best payoﬀ problem:
¯ v =m a x
x,µ(θ),w(θ)
Z £
(1 − β)R(x,µ(θ),θ) + βw(θ)
¤
p(θ) dθ (14)
subject to the constraint that x, µ(·),a n dw(·), are enforceable by W, in that they satisfy (8)-(10).
Throughout, we assume that µ(·) is a piecewise, continuously diﬀerentiable function.
The best payoﬀ problem is a mechanism design problem of choosing an incentive-compatible
allocation x,µ(·),w(·) which maximizes utility. Following the language of mechanism design, we
refer to θ as the type of the monetary authority, which changes every period. When we solve this
problem with W = W∗, (13) implies that the resulting payoﬀ is the highest incentive-compatible
payoﬀ. We will prove our main result in Proposition 1 for any W. Hence, we will not have to
explicitly solve the ﬁxed-point problem of ﬁnding W∗.
Moreover, to prove our main result we also need only focus on the best payoﬀ problem, which
gives the highest payoﬀ t h a tc a nb eo b t a i n e df r o mp e r i o d0 onward. For completeness, however,
10notice that given some w0(θ) from the best payoﬀ problem, a period 1 policy and continuation value,
µw0(θ)(·) and ww0(θ)(·), that satisfy
w0(θ)=
Z h
(1 − β)R(xw0(θ),µ w0(θ)(z),z) + βww0(θ)(z)
i
p(z) dz (15)
exist by the deﬁnition of T. Equation (15) and its analog for other periods is sometimes referred to
as a promise-keeping constraint. In our approach we never explicitly need to mention this constraint
since it is built into the deﬁnition of the operator T.
2. Characterizing the Optimal Mechanism
Now we solve the best payoﬀ problem and use the solution to characterize the optimal mech-
anism. Our main result here is that under two simple conditions, a single-crossing condition and a
monotone hazard condition, the optimal mechanism is static. To highlight the importance of the
monotone hazard condition for this result, in Appendix B we give three examples which show that
if the monotone hazard condition is violated, the optimal mechanism is dynamic.
A. Preliminaries
W eb e g i nw i t hs o m ed e ﬁnitions. In our recursive formulation, we say that a mechanism is
static if the continuation value w(θ)= ¯ w for (almost) all θ. We say that a mechanism is dynamic if
w(θ) < ¯ w for some set of θ which is realized with strictly positive probability.
Our characterization of the solution to the best payoﬀ problem does not depend on the exact
value of β. Hence, to simplify the notation, we suppress explicit dependence on β and think of the
term β a sb e i n gs u b s u m e di nt h ew function and 1 − β a sb e i n gs u b s u m e di nt h eR function.
We assume that the preferences are diﬀerentiable and satisfy a standard single-crossing as-
sumption,t h a t
Rµθ(x,µ,θ) > 0. (A1)
This implies that higher types have a stronger preference for current inﬂation. Standard arguments
can be used to show that the static best response µ∗(θ;x) is strictly increasing in θ.
Under the single-crossing assumption (A1), a standard lemma lets us replace the global
incentive constraints (10) with some local versions of them. We say that an allocation is locally








11wherever dµ(θ)/dθ and dw(θ)/dθ exist; and for any point θi at which these derivatives do not exist,
lim
θ%θi
R(x,µ(θ),θ i) + w(θ) = lim
θ&θi
R(x,µ(θ),θ i) + w(θ). (17)
Standard arguments give the following result: under the single-crossing assumption (A1), the al-
location (x,µ(·),w(·)) satisﬁes the incentive constraints (10) if and only if the allocation is locally
incentive-compatible. (See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1991) text.)
Given any incentive-compatible allocation, we deﬁne the utility of the allocation at θ to be
U(θ)=R(x,µ(θ),θ) + w(θ).
Local incentive-compatibility implies that U(·) is continuous and diﬀerentiable almost everywhere,










With integration by parts, it is easy to show that for interval endpoints θ1 <θ 2,
Z θ2
θ1




Using (18) and (20), we can write the value of the objective function
R ¯ θ













Next we make some joint assumptions on the probability distribution and the return function.
Assume that, for any action proﬁle x,µ(·) with µ(·) nondecreasing,
1 − P(θ)
p(θ)
Rθµ(x,µ(θ),θ) is strictly decreasing in θ (A2a)
P(θ)
p(θ)
Rθµ(x,µ(θ),θ) is strictly increasing in θ. (A2b)
We refer to assumptions (A2a) and (A2b) together as (A2) and, in a slight abuse of terminology,
refer to them as the monotone hazard condition. In our benchmark example (1), Rθµ(x,µ(θ),θ)
=1 , so that (A2) reduces to the standard monotone hazard condition familiar from the mechanism
design literature, that [1 − P(θ)]/p(θ) be strictly decreasing and P(θ)/p(θ) be strictly increasing.
12B. Showing That the Optimal Mechanism Is Static
Here we show that the optimal mechanism is static. In the next section, we characterize the
optimal static mechanism.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), the optimal mechanism is static.
T h ea p p r o a c hw et a k ei np r o v i n gP r o p o s i t i o n1i sd i ﬀerent from the standard approach used
by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Chapter 7.3) for solving a mathematically-related principal-agent
problem. To motivate our approach, we ﬁrst show why the standard approach does not work for
our problem.







subject to the constraints that (i) x =
R
µ(θ)p(θ) dθ, (ii) µ(θ) is nondecreasing, and (iii) the




Rθ(x,µ(z),z) dz − R(x,µ(θ),θ)








subject to the constraints (i), (ii), and (iii), the continuation values deﬁned by
w(θ) ≡ U(¯ θ) −
Z ¯ θ
θ
Rθ(x,µ(z),z) dz − R(x,µ(θ),θ)
satisfy w(θ) ≤ ¯ w for all θ.
The standard approach to solving either version of this problem is to guess that the analog
of constraints (ii) and (iii) do not bind, take the corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions of either of
these problems to ﬁnd the implied µ(·), a n dt h e nv e r i f yt h a tc o n s t r a i n t s(ii) and (iii) are in fact
satisﬁed at that choice of µ(·). If we take that approach here, we see that it fails. The ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to µ(θ) are
1 − P(θ)
p(θ)
Rθµ(x,µ(θ),θ) = λ (22)




Rθµ(x,µ(θ),θ) = λ (23)
13for the second version of the best payoﬀ problem, where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint
(i). The solution to these ﬁrst-order conditions (22) and (23), from the relaxed problem in which
we have dropped constraints (ii) and (iii), implies a decreasing µ(·) schedule. To see why, note,
for example, that the left side of equation (22) is the increment to social welfare from marginally
increasing µ(·) at some particular θ and adjusting the continuation values w(·) for θ0 ≥ θ to preserve
incentive-compatibility, while the right side is the cost in terms of welfare from raising expected
inﬂation x. Under assumption (A2a), the beneﬁts of raising µ(·) are higher for low values of θ than
for high values of θ. Thus, in the relaxed problem, it is optimal to have a downward-sloping µ(·)
schedule. Similar logic applies to (23). Clearly, then, the solution to the relaxed problem violates at
least one of the dropped constraints (ii) or (iii), and hence, we cannot use this standard approach.
We also cannot use the “ironing” approach designed to deal with cases in which the monotonic-
ity constraint (ii) binds, because in our problem, the constraint that binds is constraint (iii),w h i c h
is not dealt with in that approach. Instead, in the proof of Proposition 1 that follows, we use a
variational argument to show that constraint (iii) binds for all θ at the solution to the best payoﬀ
problem.
The key feature of our problem that leads to the failure of the standard approach is that
the continuation value enters positively into the payoﬀ of both society and the monetary authority.
Mathematically, these continuation values are analogous to the transfers between the principal and
the agent in the standard principal-agent problem presented by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Chapter
7.3). In that problem, the transfers enter positively into the agent’s problem but negatively into the
principal’s problem. This diﬀerence between our problem and the principal-agent problem is the
key reason the standard approach does not work.
Before proving Proposition 1, we sketch our basic argument. Our discussion of the ﬁrst-
order conditions of the relaxed problem (22) and (23) suggests that given any strictly increasing
µ(·) schedule, a variation that ﬂattens this schedule will improve welfare if it is feasible in the sense
that the associated continuation value satisﬁes constraint (iii). Our proof of Lemma 1 formalizes
this logic.
Our objective is to show that the optimal continuation value w(·) is constant at ¯ w. We prove
this by contradiction. We start with the observation that w(·) is piecewise-diﬀerentiable since µ(·) is
piecewise-diﬀerentiable and (16) holds. We ﬁrst show that w(·) must be a step function. If not,
t h e r ei ss o m ei n t e r v a lo v e rw h i c hw0(θ) is nonzero, and hence, from local incentive-compatibility,
14µ(·) is strictly increasing. In Lemma 2, we show that a variation that ﬂattens µ(·) over that interval
is feasible. From Lemma 1, we know it is welfare-improving.
We next show that w(·) must be continuous, and since it is a step function, it must be
constant. We prove this by showing that if w(·) is discontinuous at some point θ, then (17) implies
that µ(·) must be increasing in the sense that it jumps up at that point. In Lemma 3, we show that
a variation that ﬂattens µ(·) in a neighborhood of that point is feasible, and again from Lemma 1,
we know that it is welfare-improving.
It is convenient in the proof to use a deﬁnition of increasing on an interval which covers the
cases we deal with in Lemmas 2 and 3. This deﬁnition subsumes the case of Lemma 2 in which
dµ(θ)/dθ > 0 f o rs o m ei n t e r v a la n dt h ec a s eo fL e m m a3i nw h i c hµ(·) jumps up at ˜ θ. We say that
µ(·) is increasing on (θ1,θ2) if µ(·) is weakly increasing on this interval and there is some ˜ θ in this
interval such that µ(θ) < ˜ µ for θ<˜ θ and µ(θ) > ˜ µ for θ>˜ θ, where ˜ µ is the conditional mean of






In words, on this interval, the function µ(·) is weakly increasing and is strictly below its conditional
mean ˜ µ up to ˜ θ and strictly above its conditional mean after ˜ θ.6 Throughout, we will also say that
the policy µ(·) is ﬂat at some particular point θ if the derivative µ0(θ) exists and equals zero at that
point.
Consider now some dynamic mechanism (x,µ(·),w(·)) in which the policy µ(·) is increasing
on some interval, say, (θ1,θ 2). In our variation, we marginally move the function µ(·) toward its con-
ditional mean on this interval and adjust the continuation values to preserve incentive-compatibility.











This policy ˜ µ(·) diﬀers from the original policy µ(·) only on the interval (θ1,θ 2), and there the
original policy µ(·) is replaced by the conditional mean ˜ µ of the original policy over the interval.
6Observe that this deﬁnition of increasing is stronger than the deﬁnition of a function being weakly increasing on
an interval because our deﬁnition rules out a function that is constant over the interval. But our deﬁnition is weaker
than the deﬁnition of a function being strictly increasing over an interval because ours allows for subintervals over
which µ(·) is constant.
15Clearly, the expected inﬂation under ˜ µ(·) i st h es a m ea st h ee x p e c t e di n ﬂation under the original
policy.
We let (x(a),µ(·;a),w(·;a)) and U(·;a) denote our variation and the associated utility. The
policy µ(·;a) in our variation is a convex combination of the policy ˜ µ(·) and the original policy µ(·)
and is deﬁned by
µ(θ;a)=a˜ µ(θ)+( 1− a)µ(θ) (26)
for a ∈ [0,1]. (For a graph of µ(·;a), see Figure 1.) Clearly, the expected inﬂa t i o ni no u rv a r i a t i o n
˜ x(a) equals that of the original allocation x for all a ∈ [0,1].
The delicate part of the variation is to construct the continuation value w(·;a) so as to satisfy
the feasibility constraint w(θ;a) ≤ ¯ w for all θ, in addition to incentive-compatibility. It turns out
that we can ensure feasibility if we use one of two ways to adjust continuation values. In the up
variation, we leave the continuation values unchanged below θ1 and pass up any changes induced by
our variation in the policy to higher types by suitably adjusting the continuation values to maintain
incentive-compatibility. In the down variation, we leave the continuation values unchanged above
θ2 and pass down any changes induced by our variation in the policy to lower types by suitably
adjusting the continuation values to maintain incentive-compatibility.
In the up variation, we determine the continuation values by substituting U(θ;a)




Rθ(x,µ(z;a),z) dz − R(x,µ(θ;a),θ). (27)




Rθ(x,µ(z;a),z) dz − R(x,µ(θ;a),θ). (28)
By construction, these variations are incentive-compatible. In the following lemma, we show that,
if either variation is feasible, it improves welfare.
Lemma 1. Assume (A1) and (A2), and let (x,µ(·),w(·)) be an allocation in which µ(·) is
increasing on some interval (θ1,θ 2). Then the up variation and the down variation both increase the
objective function (21).
Proof. To see that the up variation improves welfare, use (21) to write the value of the






Rθ(x,a˜ µ(θ)+( 1− a)µ(θ),θ)p(θ) dθ. (29)
16To evaluate the eﬀect on welfare of a marginal change of this type, take the derivative of ˜ V (a) and








Rθµ(x,µ(θ),θ)[˜ µ(θ) − µ(θ)]p(θ) dθ (30)








Rθµ(x,µ(θ),θ)[˜ µ − µ(θ)]p(θ) dθ. (31)
If we divide (31) by the positive constant P(θ2) − P(θ1), then we can interpret (31) to be the
expectation of the product of two functions, namely f(θ) deﬁned as [1−P(θ)]Rθµ(x,µ(θ),θ)/p(θ) and
g(θ) deﬁned as ˜ µ−µ(θ), where the p(θ)/[P(θ2)−P(θ1)] is the density of θover the interval (θ1,θ 2).
The function f is strictly decreasing by assumption (A2a). Because the function µ(θ) is increasing
on the interval (θ1,θ 2), the function g is decreasing on this interval in the sense that g(θ) is weakly
decreasing and lies strictly below its conditional mean for θ<˜ θ and strictly above its conditional
mean for θ>˜ θ. By the deﬁnition of a covariance, we know that Efg = cov(f,g)+(Ef)(Eg), where
the expectation is taken with respect to the density p(θ)/[P(θ2) − P(θ1)]. By the construction of
˜ µ in (24), we know that Eg =0 , so that Efg = cov(f,g), which is clearly positive because f is
strictly decreasing and g is decreasing on the interval (θ1,θ2). Thus, (31) is strictly positive, and
the variation improves welfare.
The down variation also improves welfare. The value of the objective function under this
variation is














Rθµ(x,µ(θ),θ)[µ(θ) − ˜ µ]p(θ) dθ > 0 (32)
by arguments similar to those given before. Q.E.D.
To gain some intuition for how these variations improve welfare, consider the up variation
and the expression for the change in welfare (31). We show how the total eﬀect on welfare resulting
from this ﬂattening of the inﬂation schedule can be thought of as arising from two eﬀects: a positive
eﬀe c tt h a tc o m e sf r o mr a i s i n gi n ﬂation for low types and a negative eﬀect that comes from lowering
inﬂation for high types. Our assumption (A2a) ensures that the positive eﬀect outweighs the negative
eﬀect.
17For any type, the ﬂattening aﬀects both the current payoﬀ R and the continuation value w.
The impact of increasing a on the current payoﬀ for type θ is
Rµ(x,µ(θ),θ)[˜ µ(θ) − µ(θ)].






Rθµ(x,µ(z),z)[˜ µ(z) − µ(z)]dz − Rµ(x,µ(θ),θ)[˜ µ(θ) − µ(θ)]. (33)






Rθµ(x,µ(z),z)[˜ µ(z) − µ(z)]dz. (34)
Notice from (34) that any change in the policy for some particular type z aﬀects the utility of all
types θ above z.T h u s ,e a c ht e r m
[1 − P(z)]Rθµ(x,µ(z),z)[˜ µ(z) − µ(z)] (35)
in the integral (30) can be thought of as the sum of the change in utility for all types z and
above resulting from the change in the inﬂation schedule for the type z. Under our single-crossing
assumption, Rθµ(x,µ(θ),θ) > 0, so the impact of changing the policy at θ depends on the sign of
˜ µ(θ) − µ(θ). Recall that outside the interval (θ1,θ2), ˜ µ(θ)=µ(θ), so that the value of (35) is zero.
Inside the interval (θ1,θ2), ˜ µ(θ)=˜ µ, where ˜ µ is the conditional mean on this interval. By deﬁnition
of the type ˜ θ, on the interval (θ1,˜ θ), ˜ µ−µ(θ) > 0,a n do nt h ei n t e r v a l(˜ θ,θ2), ˜ µ−µ(θ) < 0. Therefore,
our variation has both a positive eﬀect and a negative eﬀect on welfare.
The positive eﬀect of ﬂattening the inﬂation schedule comes from increasing the policy of
those types θ below ˜ θ and then passing this change up to higher types. The negative eﬀect of the
ﬂattening comes from decreasing the policy for those types θ above ˜ θ. Under assumption (A2a), the
positive eﬀect outweighs the negative eﬀect.
In the down variation, the intuition for the derivative (32) is the same as that for (31), except
that, in this variation, a change in the inﬂation rate chosen by type θ aﬀects the continuation value
of all types below θ.
The following lemma proves that if w(·) is not a step function, then µ(·) is increasing on some
interval, and there is a feasible variation that ﬂattens µ(·) and improves welfare.
Lemma 2. Under (A1) and (A2), in the optimal mechanism, the continuation value function
w(·) is a step function.
18Proof. Since by assumption µ(·) is piecewise-diﬀerentiable, we know from (16) that w(·) is
too. By way of contradiction, assume that w(·) is not a step function. Hence, there is an interval
over which w0(θ) exists and does not equal zero. Clearly, then, there is a subinterval (θ1,θ 2) over
which w0(θ) is either strictly positive or strictly negative, and w(θ) ≤ ¯ w − ε for some ε>0. From








so that regardless of the sign of w0(θ), we have that µ0(θ) > 0 on this interval. Hence, µ(·) is
increasing on (θ1,θ 2) in the sense deﬁned above. From Lemma 1, we know that, if the up and down
variations are feasible, then they both improve welfare.
To complete the proof, we show that either the up variation or the down variation is always
feasible. Under the up variation, (26) and (27) imply that w(θ;a) equals w(θ) for θ ≤ θ1 and
w(θ)+∆(a)




[Rθ(x,µ(z;a),z) − Rθ(x,µ(z),z)] dz. (36)
See Figure 2 for a graph of w(θ;a) in the up variation. This graph illustrates several features
of w(θ;a):i tc o i n c i d e sw i t hw(θ) for θ ≤ θ1, it diﬀers from w(θ) by the constant ∆(a) for θ ≥ θ2,
and it jumps at both θ1 and θ2. This last feature follows from (17) and the fact that µ(θ;a) jumps
at these points. Notice in the graph that w(θ) ≤ ¯ w − ε for θ ∈ (θ1,θ 2).
Under the down variation, (26) and (28) imply that w(θ;a) equals
w(θ) − ∆(a) (37)
for θ ≤ θ1 and w(θ) for θ ≥ θ2. See Figure 3 for a graph of w(θ;a) in the down variation.
To ensure that the continuation value satisﬁes feasibility, we do the following. We use the
up variation when term ∆(a) ≤ 0 and the down variation when that term is positive. By doing so,
we ensure that outside the interval (θ1,θ2) the continuation value under this variation is no larger
than the original continuation value w(θ),w h i c h ,b ya s s u m p t i o n ,i sf e a s i b l e .W ek n o wt h a ti n s i d e
the interval (θ1,θ 2), w(θ) ≤ ¯ w − ε. Since R is continuous in µ,w ec a nc h o o s ea small enough to
ensure that w(θ;a) ≤ ¯ w. Q.E.D.
19In the next lemma, we show that the optimal policy w(θ) is continuous. Since we know from
L e m m a2t h a tw(·) is a step function, we conclude that w(·) is a constant. Optimality implies that
this constant is ¯ w.
Lemma 3. Under (A1) and (A2), w(θ) is continuous for all θ.
Proof. In Appendix A, we prove that w(·) is continuous by contradiction. We show that
if w(·) jumps at some point ˜ θ, then the same up variation and down variation we used in Lemma
1w i l li m p r o v ew e l f a r e . T h eo n l yd i ﬃcult part of the proof is showing that when the appropriate
interval (θ1,θ2) is selected that contains the jump point ˜ θ, the associated continuation values are
feasible. Here it may turn out that the feasibility constraint binds inside the interval (θ1,θ2), in that
the original allocation has w(θ)=¯ w for some θ in (θ1,θ2). Thus, we cannot simply shrink the size
of the weight a in the variation to ensure feasibility on (θ1,θ2), as we did in the proof of Lemma 2.
Instead we show that the variation is feasible inside the interval (θ1,θ2) by direct calculations that
we relegate to Appendix A. Q.E.D.
Together Lemmas 2 and 3 establish Proposition 1, that under our assumptions, the optimal
mechanism is static. Our characterization of optimal policy relied on the monotone hazard assump-
tion (A2). Under this assumption, we showed that the dynamic mechanism design problem has a
static solution. In Appendix B, we give three simple examples in which the monotone hazard con-
dition (A2) is violated yet the dynamic mechanism design problem does not have a static solution.
In the ﬁrst two of these examples (A2) fails because (1 − P(θ))/p(θ) is not monotone, in the third
(A2a) fails because Rµθ is increasing at a suﬃciently rapid rate.
3. The Optimal Degree of Discretion
So far we have demonstrated that the optimal mechanism is static. Now we characterize the
optimal static mechanism. We show three results: The optimal policy has either bounded discretion
or no discretion. A policy with either bounded discretion or no discretion can be implemented
by society setting an upper limit, or cap, on the inﬂation rate which the monetary authority is
allowed to choose. And the optimal degree of discretion is decreasing the more severe is the time
inconsistency problem and the less important is private information.
20A. Characterizing the Optimal Policy
In the optimal static mechanism, the monetary policy µ(·) maximizes
Z
R(x,µ(θ),θ)p(θ) dθ (38)
subject to the constraints that x =
R
µ(θ)p(θ) dθ and R(x,µ(θ),θ) ≥ R(x,µ(ˆ θ),θ) for all θ,ˆ θ.





µ∗(θ;x) if θ ∈ [θ,θ ∗)





where µ∗(θ;x) i st h es t a t i cb e s tr e s p o n s eg i v e nw a g e sx =
R
µ(θ)p(θ) dθ. Thus, for θ<θ ∗, the
monetary authority chooses the static best response, and for θ ≥ θ∗, the monetary authority chooses
the upper limit µ∗. A policy has no discretion if µ(θ)=µ for some constant µ, so that regardless of
θ, the monetary authority chooses the same growth rate. Clearly, the best policy with no discretion
is the expected Ramsey policy.7
We show that the optimal policy has either bounded discretion or no discretion. Here, as
before, we can replace the global incentive constraint in (38) with the local incentive constraints,
with the restriction that w(θ)=¯ w. In particular, (17) implies that µ(·) is continuous, while (16),
namely, Rµdµ/dθ =0 , implies that for all θ, µ(θ) is either ﬂat or equal to the static best response.
Clearly, if µ(·) is ﬂat everywhere, it is a constant; hence, it equals the expected Ramsey policy,
which by deﬁnition is the best constant policy. If µ(·) is not ﬂat everywhere, then it must be of the
following form for some θ1 and θ2:
µ(θ)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
µ1 = µ∗(θ1;x) if θ ∈ [θ ,θ1)
µ∗(θ;x) if θ ∈ [θ1,θ2]
µ2 = µ∗(θ2;x) if θ ∈ (θ2,¯ θ]
⎤





µ(θ)p(θ) dθ. In words, the policy must be constant up to some point θ1 ≥ θ and equal
to the static best response of type θ1; it must be equal to the static best response of each type
θ ∈ [θ1,θ 2] with θ2 ≤ ¯ θ; and then it must be constant and equal to the static best response of type
θ2.
7Note that the best policy with no discretion, the Ramsey policy, will not typically be a special case of a policy with
bounded discretion. Speciﬁcally, when θ
∗ = θ,t h ef o r m( 39) yields one particular policy with no discretion, namely,
µ(θ)=µ
∗(θ;x) for all θ. But this policy does not typically coincide with the expected Ramsey policy µ
ER since the
best response of the lowest type is not typically the expected Ramsey policy.
21In the following proposition, we show that if the optimal policy is not the expected Ramsey
policy, then it must be of the form (40) with θ1 equal to θ, so that the policy’s form reduces to the
b o u n d e dd i s c r e t i o nf o r mi n( 3 9 ) .
Proposition 2. Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), the optimal policy µ(·) has either
bounded discretion or no discretion.
Proof. We have argued that if the optimal policy is constant, then it must be an expected
Ramsey policy, which has no discretion. If the optimal policy is not constant, then it must be of the
form (40). But µ(θ) having the form (40) with θ1 >θcannot be optimal. To see this, observe that
an alternative policy ˜ µ(θ) of the same form would exist with ˜ θ1 <θ 1 and ˜ θ2 = θ2. We illustrate this
alternative policy in Figure 4. This alternative policy ˜ µ(θ) would be closer to µ∗(θ,x) wherever it
diﬀers from µ(θ) and would satisfy
R
˜ µ(θ)p(θ) dθ <
R
µ(θ)p(θ) dθ = x. Hence, this alternative policy
˜ µ(θ) would be strictly preferred to µ(θ); the change from µ(θ) to ˜ µ(θ) directly improves welfare for
all types θ<θ 1, with x held ﬁxed. The change also reduces x, which by (4) contributes to improving
total welfare. More formally, observe that the marginal impact on welfare of a marginal reduction
















whichis positive since Rµ(x,µ∗(θ1;x),θ)< 0, ∂µ∗(θ1;x)/∂θ > 0, ∆θ1 < 0, ∆x<0, and (4). Q.E.D.
B. Implementing Optimal Policy with an Inﬂation Cap
or a Range of Inﬂation Rates
We have characterized the solution to a dynamic mechanism design problem. We now imagine
implementing the resulting outcome with an inﬂation cap, a highest level of allowable inﬂation ¯ π. We
imagine that society legislates this highest allowable level and that doing so restricts the monetary
authority’s choices to be µt ≤ ¯ π. If this cap is appropriately set and agents simply play the repeated
one-shot equilibrium of the resulting game with this inﬂation cap, then the monetary authority will
optimally choose the outcome of the mechanism design problem. In this sense, the repeated one-shot
game with an inﬂation cap implements the policy that solves the best payoﬀ problem.
The intuition for this result–that a policy with either bounded discretion or no discretion
can be implemented by setting an upper limit on permissible inﬂation rates–is simple. In our
environment, the only potentially beneﬁcial deviations from either type of policy are ones that raise
22inﬂation. Under bounded discretion, the types in [θ,θ∗) are choosing their static best response to
wages and, hence, have no incentive to deviate, whereas the types in (θ∗,¯ θ] have an incentive to
deviate to a higher rate than ¯ π. Similarly, from Proposition 3 (stated and proved below), we know
that if the expected Ramsey policy is optimal, then at this policy all types have an incentive to
deviate to higher rates of inﬂation. Hence, an inﬂation cap of ¯ π = µER implements such a policy.
(For completeness, we formalize this argument in Appendix C.)
Clearly, we can also implement the optimal policy with a range of inﬂation rates denoted [π,
¯ π]. The top end of such a range is the inﬂation cap, ¯ π, discussed above. The bottom end of the
range, π,i ss i m p l yt h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yc h o s e nb yt h el o w e s tt y p eθ in the optimal static mechanism.
Under a policy of bounded discretion, π < ¯ π, while under a policy of no discretion, π =¯ π.
C. Linking Discretion with Time Inconsistency and Private Information
So far we have shown that the optimal policy has either bounded discretion or no discretion.
Here we link the optimal degree of discretion to the severity of the time inconsistency problem relative
to the importance of private information. We show that the more severe the time inconsistency
problem, the smaller is the optimal degree of discretion. Likewise, we show that the less important
the private information, the smaller is the optimal degree of discretion.
The literature using general equilibrium models to study optimal monetary policies suggests a
qualitative way to measure the severity of the time inconsistency problem. In most of this literature,
the time inconsistency problem is severe in that the static Nash equilibrium is always at the highest
feasible inﬂation rate ¯ µ. This result follows because the static best response of the monetary authority
to any given level of expected inﬂation is always above that level and thus, the monetary authority
is always tempted to generate a monetary surprise. Examples of the models with the more severe
problems include those of Ireland (1997); Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1998); and Sleet
(2001). In the rest of the literature the problem is less severe, in that the static Nash equilibrium
is interior. Examples of the models with the less severe problems include those of Chang (1998),
Nicolini (1998), and Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano (2003).
In our reduced-form model, we can mimic the general equilibrium models with the more
severe problems by choosing a payoﬀ function R for which Rµ(x,x,θ) > 0 for all θ. That is, in
response to any choice of wages x, the monetary authority wants to choose inﬂation higher than
x, regardless of its type. Under (A1) this condition is equivalent to requiring that the static best
response function satisﬁes µ∗(θ,x) ≥ x for all x ∈ [µ, ¯ µ]. We show in the next proposition that this
23condition implies that the optimal policy has no discretion.
We can mimic the general equilibrium models with the less severe problems by choosing a
payoﬀ function R for which the static Nash equilibrium best response is interior. For such a payoﬀ
function the optimal policy will typically depend on parameters. When the time inconsistency
problem is suﬃciently mild, however, we can show a general result, namely that optimal policy
must have bounded discretion. Here by mild we mean that when wages are set at the expected
Ramsey level, the lowest type wants to set inﬂation at some level lower than the expected Ramsey
level. Technically, we can state this condition as the static best response satisﬁes µ∗(θ,µ ER) <µ ER
or equivalently the payoﬀ function satisﬁes Rµ(µER,µ ER,θ) < 0.
We summarize this discussion as follows.
Proposition 3. Assume (A1) and (A2) then i) i ft h es t a t i cb e s tr e s p o n s es a t i s ﬁes µ∗(θ,x) ≥
x for all x ∈ [µ, ¯ µ] then the optimal policy has no discretion and ii) if the static best response
satisﬁes µ∗(θ,µ ER) <µ ER then the optimal policy has bounded discretion.
Proof. Under (A1) and (A2), the optimal mechanism is static. To prove i) note that in any




µ∗(θ,x)p(θ)dθ +( 1− P(θ∗))µ∗(θ∗,x) (41)
Under (A1), µ∗(θ,x) is strictly increasing in θ whenever µ∗(θ,x) < ¯ µ. Thus, µ∗(θ,x) ≥ x for all
x ∈ [µ, ¯ µ] implies that whenever θ∗ >θ , the right side of (41) is greater than the left side of (41) for
any x<¯ µ. The only feasible policies of the bounded discretion form must have θ∗ = θ or x =¯ µ and
hence reduce to policies with no discretion. The optimal policy with no discretion, the expected
Ramsey policy, by deﬁnition yields higher welfare.
We prove ii) by contradiction. Assume that µ∗(θ,µ ER) <µ ER, but that the optimal policy
has no discretion. The variation used in Proposition 2 immediately implies that such a policy cannot
be optimal. Thus, the optimal policy must have bounded discretion. Q.E.D.
In Proposition 3 we have characterized the form of the optimal policy for two cases for which
this can be done independently of parameters. To characterize the optimal policy in the remaining
case iii) in which µ∗(θ,µ ER) >µ ER but there exists an x such that µ∗(θ,x) <x ,we turn to our
benchmark example (1).
In general, the choice of the optimal inﬂation cap depends on the importance of private
information relative to the severity of the time inconsistency problem. In our benchmark example the
24parameter α indexes the importance of private information and the parameter U indexes the severity
of the time inconsistency problem. To see why α indexes the importance of private information note
that the Ramsey policy is µR(θ)=αθ/2, so that the slope increases with α. Hence, as α increases,
the Ramsey policy responds more to the private information θ a n dt h eg a pi nw e l f a r eb e t w e e n
t h eR a m s e yp o l i c ya n dt h ee x p e c t e dR a m s e yp o l i c yg r o w s . T os e ew h yU indexes the severity
of the time inconsistency problem, note that the Nash inﬂation rate is xN = U, and the Nash
policies are µ∗(θ;U)=U +αθ/2. The Ramsey inﬂation rate is xR =0 , and the Ramsey policies are
µR(θ)=αθ/2. Thus, for each type θ, the Nash policies are simply the Ramsey policies shifted up
by U. As U gets smaller, the Nash policies converge to the Ramsey policies. When U is zero, the
Nash and Ramsey policies coincide.
When the objective function satisﬁes (1), the condition µ∗(θ;µER) <µ ER in Proposition
3 reduces to U/α < −θ, where θ is a negative number. Proposition 3 thus implies that bounded
discretion is optimal when private information is important relative to the severity of the time
inconsistency problem. We characterize the optimal mechanism more fully in the benchmark case
in the next proposition to get a more precise link between the severity of the time inconsistency
problem and the optimal degree of discretion.
For policies of the bounded discretion form (39), we think of θ∗ as indexing the degree of
discretion. If θ∗ = ¯ θ, then all types θ are on their static best responses, and, hence, we say there is
complete discretion. As θ∗ decreases, fewer types are on their static best responses, and, hence, we
say there is less discretion. We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Assume (1), (A1), and (A2a). If U/α =0 , then the optimal policy has
complete discretion. If U/α ∈ (0,−θ), then that policy has bounded discretion with θ∗ < ¯ θ. The
optimal degree of discretion θ∗ is decreasing in U/α.As U/αapproaches −θ,t h ec u t o ﬀ θ∗ approaches
θ .I fU/α ≥− θ, then the optimal policy is the expected Ramsey policy with no discretion.
We prove this proposition by direct calculations that we provide in Appendix D. Figure 5
illustrates the proposition for two economies with diﬀerent degrees relative importance of private
information and severity of time inconsistency problems, (U/α)H > (U/α)L. In these two economies,
we denote the optimal policies by µH(·) indexed by θ∗
H and µL(·) indexed by θ∗
L, along with the
inﬂation caps ¯ πH and ¯ πL.
254. Comparison to the Literature
Our result on the optimality of a static mechanism is quite diﬀerent from what is typically
found in dynamic contracting problems, namely, that static mechanisms are not optimal. Using a
recursive approach, we have shown how our dynamic mechanism design problem reduces to a simple
quasi-linear mechanism design problem. Our results are thus also directly comparable to the large
literature on mechanism design with broad applications, including those in industrial organization,
public ﬁnance, and auctions. (See Fudenberg and Tirole’s 1991 book for an introduction to mech-
anism design and its applications.) In this comparison, the continuation values in our framework
correspond to the contractual compensation to the agent in the mechanism design literature. Our
result that the optimal mechanism is static, so that the continuation values do not vary with type,
stands in contrast to the standard result in the mechanism design literature that under the optimal
contract, the compensation to the agent varies with the agent’s type. In this sense, our result is also
quite diﬀerent from what is found in the mechanism design literature.
We believe that the key feature of our model that distinguishes it from much of the dynamic
incentive literature is the constraint
w(θ) ≤ ¯ w. (42)
The implication of this constraint is that it is not possible to trade oﬀ the continuation values of one
type against another as it is in many other models. To highlight the importance of this constraint
we consider a highly stylized example in Appendix E that replaces the constraint (42) with
Z
w(θ)p(θ)dθ ≤ ¯ w (43)
and shows that the answer diﬀers radically in that the optimal value of w varies with θ. Now what
is the diﬀerence between constraints (42) and (43)? In providing incentives under (43) it is possible
to trade oﬀ a low continuation value for one type against a high continuation value for another.
This feature is common in a wide variety of incentive problems, and in such problems the optimal
incentive scheme has w(θ) varying with the type θ. In contrast, when providing incentives under
(42) it is not possible to make this tradeoﬀ: a low value of w(θ) for one type does not allow us to
raise the value of w(θ) for some other type. Hence, under (42) using w(θ) to provide incentives is
akin to burning money.
There is a large class of dynamic incentive models that might usefully be thought of as debt
models. Early versions of these include the private debt models of Green (1987), Thomas and
26Worall (1990), Atkeson (1991) and Atkeson and Lucas (1992, 1995) while later versions include the
government debt models of Sleet (forthcoming) and Sleet and Yeltekin (2003). All of these models
share the feature that optimal contracts are dynamic because in each of these settings it is possible
to trade a low continuation for one type against a high continuation value for another type. In this
sense the debt models share many of the features of models with constraints of the form (43) rather
than models with constraints of the form (42).
Having a constraint like (42) rather than (43) is important for our result that the optimal
m e c h a n i s mi ss t a t i c ,b u ti ti sn o ts u ﬃcient, for at least two reasons. First, even in our model,
we have given examples in which the optimal mechanism is dynamic when our monotone hazard
condition is violated. Second, the information structure is also important. In our model, private
agents receive no direct information about the state. If private agents receive a noisy signal about
the state before the monetary authority takes its action, then our results go through pretty much
unchanged; the noisy signal is just a publicly observed variable upon which the inﬂation cap is
conditioned. If, however, private agents receive a noisy signal about the information the monetary
authority received after the monetary authority takes its action, then dynamic mechanisms in which
continuation values vary with this signal may be optimal.
Sleet (2001) considers such an information structure and shows that the optimality of the
dynamic mechanism depends on the parameters governing the noise. He ﬁnds that when the public
signal about the monetary authority’s information is suﬃciently noisy, it is not optimal to have
the monetary authority’s action depend on its private information; hence, the optimal mechanism is
static. In contrast, when this public signal is suﬃciently precise, the optimal mechanism is dynamic.
The logic of why a dynamic mechanism is optimal is roughly similar to that in the literature in
industrial organization following Green and Porter (1984) on optimal collusive agreements that are
supported by periodic reversion to price wars, even though these price wars lower all ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
Our work here is also related to some of the repeated game literature in industrial organization
about supporting collusion in oligopolies. Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Athey, Bagwell, and
Sanchirico (2004) solve for the best trigger strategy-type equilibria in games with hidden information
about cost types. Athey and Bagwell (2001) show that, in general, the best equilibrium is dynamic
(nonstationary). In this equilibrium, a ﬁrm which sets low prices gets a lower discounted value of
proﬁts from then on. Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) show that when strategies are restricted
to be strongly symmetric, so that all ﬁr m sr e c e i v et h es a m ec o n t i n u a t i o nv a l u e se v e nt h o u g ht h e
27took observably diﬀerent actions, a diﬀerent result emerges. In particular, under some conditions,
the best equilibrium is stationary and entails pooling of all cost types. When those conditions fail,
and when ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient, there may be a set of stationary and nonstationary equilibria
that yield the same payoﬀs. (The latter result relies heavily on the Revenue Equivalence Theorem
from auction theory.)
5. Conclusion
What is the optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy? For economies in which pri-
vate information is not important or time inconsistency problems are severe the optimal degree of
discretion is zero. For economies in which private information is important and time inconsistency
problems are less severe, it is not zero, but bounded. More generally, the optimal degree of dis-
cretion is decreasing the more severe is the time inconsistency problem and the less important is
private information. For all of these economies, the optimal policy can be implemented by enforcing
as i m p l ei n ﬂation cap.
In our simple model, the optimal inﬂation cap is a single number because there is no publicly
observed state. If the model were extended to have a publicly observed state, then the optimal
policy would respond to this state, but not to the private information. To implement optimal
p o l i c y ,s o c i e t yw o u l dn e e dt os p e c i f yar u l ef o rs e t t i n gt h ei n ﬂation cap, where the cap would vary
with public information. Equivalently, society could specify a rule for setting ranges for acceptable
inﬂation, where these ranges would vary with public information. We interpret these rules as a type
of inﬂation targeting that is broadly similar to the types actually practiced by a fair number of
countries. (For a discussion of inﬂation targeting in practice, see Bernanke and Mishkin (1997).)
To keep our theoretical model simple, we have abstracted from exotic events which are both
unforeseen and unquantiﬁable. Anyone interpreting the implications of our results for an actual
society, therefore, should keep in mind that to handle such exotic events, the optimal policy rule
would need to be adapted to deal with such events, perhaps by the addition of some type of escape
clauses.
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31Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that w(·) jumps at some point ˜ θ. Since w(·) is
a step function, w0(θ)=0in some interval (θ1,θ 2) containing ˜ θ. Clearly, this implies that either
w(θ) < ¯ w for all θ in (θ1,˜ θ) or w(θ) < ¯ w for all θ in (˜ θ,θ2). W ek n o wf r o m( 1 6 )t h a ta ta n yp o i n t
θ in the intervals (θ1,˜ θ) and (˜ θ,θ2),e i t h e rµ0(θ)=0 ,s ot h a tµ(·) is ﬂat, or Rµ(x,µ(θ),θ) =0 ,s o
that µ(θ) equals the static best response. By continuity of the static best response, we can choose
the points θ1 and θ2 to be close enough to ˜ θ so that µ(·) either is constant on the interval (θ1,˜ θ) or
equals the static best response on this interval, and similarly for the interval (˜ θ,θ2).
Consider ﬁrst the hard case, namely, when µ(·) is constant on both (θ1,˜ θ) and (˜ θ,θ2). Let
(µ1,w 1) denote the allocation on (θ1,˜ θ) and (µ2,w 2) denote the allocation on (˜ θ,θ2).B y t h e
continuity of Rµ, we can choose this interval (θ1,θ2) small enough so that if Rµ(x,µ1,˜ θ) is strictly
positive, then so is Rµ(x,µ1,θ1),a n di fRµ(x,µ2,˜ θ) is strictly negative, then so is Rµ(x,µ2,θ2).
Suppose that for the chosen interval (θ1,θ 2), the term ∆(a),d e ﬁned in (36), is negative for
small a. If the up variation is feasible, then we know it improves welfare, based on the same logic as
in the proof of Lemma 2. By construction, the up variation is incentive-compatible. This variation
is feasible outside the interval (θ1,θ2), based on the logic of the proof of Lemma 2. We complete
the proof for this case by showing that the variation is also feasible inside the interval (θ1,θ 2).
Suppose, initially, that R(x,µ1,˜ θ) >R (x,µ2,˜ θ).F r o m( 17) we have that w1 <w 2, and from
the feasibility of the original allocation that w2 ≤ ¯ w. This case is illustrated in Figure 6a. For
θ ∈ (θ1,˜ θ),w et h u sk n o wt h a tw(θ;a) ≤ ¯ w for suﬃciently small a.
For θ ∈ (˜ θ,θ2),i fw2 < ¯ w, then since a is suﬃciently small, w(θ;a) ≤ ¯ w. If w2 =¯ w,w es h o w
that ∂ ˜ w(θ;0)/∂a is negative for θ ∈ (˜ θ,θ2) as follows. Diﬀerentiate (27) to obtain that ∂ ˜ w(θ;0)/∂a
equals
(˜ µ − µ1)
Z ˜ θ
θ1
Rθµ(x,µ1,z) dz +(˜ µ − µ2)
Z θ2
˜ θ
Rθµ(x,µ2,z) dz − Rµ(x,µ2θ)(˜ µ − µ2). (44)
Using
R θ2
˜ θ Rθµ(x,µ2,z) dz = Rµ(x,µ2,θ2)−Rµ(x,µ2,˜ θ) and an analogous expression for
R ˜ θ
θ1 Rθµ(x,µ1,z) dz,
we can write (44) as
[Rµ(x,µ1,˜ θ) − Rµ(x,µ1,θ 1)](˜ µ − µ2) − Rµ(x,µ2,˜ θ)(˜ µ − µ2). (45)
We will show that (45) is negative. To do so, we begin by noting that ∆0(0) < 0. This is true
because ∆(0) = 0, and we have assumed that ∆(a) is negative for small a. Using the form of µ(θ)
on the interval (θ1,θ 2),w eh a v et h a t
∆0(0) = (˜ µ − µ1)
Z ˜ θ
θ1
Rθµ(x,µ1,θ) dθ +(˜ µ − µ2)
Z θ2
˜ θ
Rθµ(x,µ2,θ) dθ < 0.
Substituting for the integrals, we can write this inequality as
[Rµ(x,µ1,˜ θ) − Rµ(x,µ1,θ 1)](˜ µ − µ1)+[ Rµ(x,µ2,θ2) − Rµ(x,µ2,˜ θ)](˜ µ − µ2) < 0. (46)
32Comparing the inequality in (46) with the expression in (45), we can see that a suﬃcient condition
for (45) to be negative is that
Rµ(x,µ2,θ 2)(˜ µ − µ2) > 0. (47)
We now show that (47) holds. Note that since µ(·) is increasing on the interval (θ1,θ2),i t
follows by deﬁnition that ˜ µ<µ 2, since, by construction, ˜ µ is the conditional mean of µ(θ) on this
interval. Thus, (47) is positive if Rµ(x,µ2,θ 2) is negative. To see that Rµ(x,µ2,θ2) is negative, note
that since w1 ≤ ¯ w and w2 =¯ w, the incentive constraint R(x,µ1,˜ θ)+w1 = R(x,µ2,˜ θ)+¯ w implies that
R(x,µ1,˜ θ) ≥ R(x,µ2,˜ θ). Since µ2 >µ 1 and R is strictly concave, we know that Rµ(x,µ2,˜ θ) < 0. By
o u rc o n s t r u c t i o no ft h ei n t e r v a l ,s i n c eRµ(x,µ2,˜ θ) is strictly negative, so is Rµ(x,µ2,θ 2).T h u s ,f o r
this case, the up variation is feasible, incentive-compatible, and welfare-improving. An analogous
argument holds when R(x,µ1,˜ θ) <R (x,µ2,˜ θ) and ¯ w ≥ w1 >w 2, as in Figure 6b.
So far we have considered the case when µ(·) is constant on both sides of ˜ θ and the term
∆(a) is negative for small a. I nt h ec a s ew h e nµ(·) is constant on both sides of ˜ θ but the term ∆(a) is
positive for small a, we use the down variation and an analogous argument.
T h ec a s ew h e nµ(·) is constant on one side of ˜ θ and equal to the static best response on the
other side of ˜ θ is the easy case. Suppose, for example, that µ(·) equals the static best response for
θ on some interval (θ1,˜ θ).H e r ew es i m p l yt a k et h er e l e v a n ti n t e r v a lt ob e(θ1,˜ θ), from some point
θ1 just below the jump point ˜ θ up to the jump point ˜ θ.C l e a r l y ,µ(·) is increasing on the interval
(θ1,˜ θ). We claim that w(·) is uniformly bounded below ¯ w, and so Lemma 2 immediately applies.
We prove that w(·) is uniformly bounded below ¯ w on (θ1,˜ θ) as follows. Since µ(·) jumps up at
˜ θ, it lies strictly above the static best response for some interval (˜ θ,θ2), so that limθ%˜ θ R(x,µ(θ),˜ θ)
> limθ&˜ θ R(x,µ(θ),˜ θ). Hence, from condition (17) in local incentive-compatibility, we know that
limθ%˜ θ w(θ) < limθ&˜ θ w(θ). Thus, for θ ∈ (θ1,˜ θ),w (θ) is uniformly bounded below ¯ w.
With an analogous argument, we can rule out the case in which µ(θ) equals the static best
response for θ on the other side of the jump point, on some interval (˜ θ,θ2). Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Optimal Policy without Monotone Hazards
Here we give three examples in which our monotone hazard condition is violated and in
which the optimal mechanism is dynamic. In the ﬁrst two examples, we assume that the hazard
[1−P(θ)]/p(θ) is decreasing in θ at all points except the point θ1, where the hazard jumps up. We
also assume that P(θ)/p(θ) is increasing throughout. In the third example, we shed light on the
role of Rµθ in (A2) by assuming that the hazard [1 − P(θ)]/p(θ) is decreasing throughout but that
[1 − P(θ)]Rµθ/p(θ) is not.











33To interpret this inequality, note that the left side is the conditional mean of the function [1 −
P(θ)]/p(θ) over the interval [θ,θ1] while the right side is the conditional mean of this function over
the interval (θ1,¯ θ]. Clearly, for any distribution for which [1 − P(θ)]/p(θ) is decreasing throughout
[θ,¯ θ], this inequality is reversed.
It is easy to show that a two-piece uniform distribution with p(θ)=ρ1 if θ ≤ θ1 and p(θ)=ρ2
if θ>θ 1 will satisfy (48) if ρ2 is chosen to be suﬃciently small relative to ρ1. In this case, illustrated
in Figure 7, the function [1−P(θ)]/p(θ) will jump up suﬃciently at θ1 so that the conditional mean
of this function over the higher interval [θ1,¯ θ] is larger than the conditional mean over the lower
interval [θ,θ1).
In the ﬁrst example, the linear example, we make the calculations trivial by assuming that
R(x,µ,θ)=( θ − θ)µ + r(x) with r(x)=−x2/2. In the second example, which is the benchmark





(U + x − µ)2 +( µ − θ)2
i
. (49)
In the third example, the discrete example, R(x,µ,θ)=g(θ)µ+r(x) with g an increasing nonlinear
function.
All three of these examples satisfy the single-crossing property (A1). In the ﬁrst two of them,
Rθµ =1 , so that the conditions (A2) reduce to the standard monotone hazard conditions. Note
that for the ﬁrst two examples, any distribution that satisﬁes (48) is inconsistent with the monotone
hazard condition (A2a).
The Linear Example





(µ1,w 1) for θ ∈ [θ,θ1)
(µ2,w 2) for θ ∈ [θ1,¯ θ]
⎤
⎦. (50)
This follows because the arguments used in Lemmas 1 and 2 can be applied separately to the intervals
[θ,θ 1) and (θ1,¯ θ] and because for any θ>θ , the static best response to any x in the interval [µ, ¯ µ]
is a constant, namely, the upper limit ¯ µ. Since this policy must satisfy the incentive constraint
(θ1 − θ)µ1 + w1 =( θ1 − θ)µ2 + w2, the monotonicity condition µ1 ≤ µ2 implies that w1 ≥ w2.
Thus, we know that w1 =¯ w and that the constraint w2 ≤ ¯ w will be automatically satisﬁed by any
monotonic policy.
The mechanism design problem then reduces to the linear problem of choosing µ1, µ2,a n dx
to maximize











subject to the constraints that µ ≤ µ1 ≤ µ2 ≤ ¯ µ and that x = P(θ1)µ1 +[ 1− P(θ1)]µ2. If (48)
holds and if the lower and upper limits µ, ¯ µ include the expected Ramsey policy, then the optimal
34policy will have either µ = µ1 <µ 2 or µ1 <µ 2 =¯ µ. To see this, consider spreading out the
policy by decreasing µ1 by ∆1 and increasing µ2 by ∆2 so that the change in expected inﬂation














P(θ1)∆1 > 0 (51)
where the inequality follows from (48). Hence, the solution must have µ1 <µ 2, and from the
incentive constraint, we then know that w2 <w 1 =¯ w. Thus, the solution to the mechanism design
problem is necessarily dynamic.
The Benchmark Example
Assume that the policy µ(·), which solves the static mechanism design problem, has bounded
discretion and that θ1 >θ ∗, s ot h a tt h ej u m pp o i n ti nt h eh a z a r do c c u r so nt h eﬂa tp o r t i o no ft h a t
policy. (We can construct a numerical example in which this assumption holds.) We will show that
there is a dynamic mechanism that improves on the optimal static mechanism. The basic idea is to
use a variation that spreads out the policy as a function of type instead of ﬂattens it as we did in
Lemmas 1 and 2.
This variation is similar to the one in the linear example. Consider an alternative policy that






µ(θ) − ∆0 if θ ≤ θ1
µ(θ)+∆1 if θ>θ 1
⎤
⎦
with ∆0,∆1 > 0 and [1−P(θ1)]∆1−P(θ1)∆0 =0 , so that expected inﬂation is constant. Note that
this alternative policy ˜ µ(·) is monotonically increasing since µ(·) must be monotonically increasing.
Our variation is a marginal shift from µ(·) toward ˜ µ(·) deﬁned as µ(θ;a)=a˜ µ(θ)+( 1− a)µ(θ) for
each θ. Welfare is given by






The impact of this variation on welfare is given by
∂V(0)
∂a












Since µ(θ) has bounded discretion, Rµ(x,µ(θ),θ)=0 . In our quadratic example, Rθµ(x,µ(z),z) =1 ;
hence, (52) reduces to (51), which we know from (48) is positive.
35It is straightforward, but somewhat tedious, to show that the associated continuation values
w(θ;a) deﬁned by
R(x,µ(θ;a),θ) +¯ w +
Z θ
θ
Rθ(x,µ(z;a)) dz − R(x,µ(θ;a),θ)
have ∂w(θ;0)/∂a ≤ 0 for all θ and ∂w(θ;0)/∂a < 0 for θ>θ 1. To do so, we use the facts that
Rµ(x,µ(θ),θ) =0and that θ1 >θ ∗,s ot h a tµ(θ)=µ(θ1) for θ ≥ θ1. These results imply that this
variation both improves welfare and is feasible. Thus, the optimal mechanism must be dynamic.
Note that if µ(·) has no discretion, then we need a diﬀerent condition on the distribution to
show that the static mechanism is not optimal. This is because when µ(·) has no discretion, we
can have Rµ(x,µ(θ),θ) > 0, and the above argument that ∂w(θ;0)/∂a ≤ 0 for all θ does not go
through. When µ(·) has no discretion, the analog of the condition (48) is that at x = µ = µER,












With this condition, the optimal mechanism is dynamic rather than static. Note that, in our linear
example, this distinction did not come up because in the linear example, our utility function is such
that Rµ(x,µ(θ),θ) =0with no discretion.
T h eD i s c r e t eE x a m p l e
Let the types be θi for i =1 ,2,3 with associated probabilities pi and let Pi =
Pi
j=0 pi. It is
easy to show that under the discrete analog of (A1) the only relevant incentive constraints are
R(x,µi,θ i)+wi ≥ (1 − β)R(x,µi+1,θi)+βwi+1 (53)
for i =1and 2. The discrete analog of (A2) for types θ2 and θ3 is
1 − P1
p2
[Rµ(x,µ2,θ2) − Rµ(x,µ2,θ1)] >
1 − P2
p3
[Rµ(x,µ3,θ 3) − Rµ(x,µ3,θ 2)]
which here reduces to
1 − P1
p2
[g(θ2) − g(θ1)] >
1 − P2
p3
[g(θ3) − g(θ2)] (54)
We now give an example in which the hazard (1−Pi)/pi+1 is monotone but g is increasing suﬃciently
convex so that (54) is violated and the optimal policy is dynamic. Suppose that µ2 = µ3 is part of
a candidate optimal policy. Consider the variation of decreasing µ1 and µ2 by ∆ and increasing µ3
by (p1 + p2)∆/p3 so that expected inﬂation x is constant. We can maintain incentives by keeping
w1 and w2 unchanged and lowering w3 by θ3∆/p3. This variation leads to a change in welfare of
(p1 + p2)g(θ3) − (1 + p2)g(θ2) − p1g(θ1)
With a uniform distribution, pi =1 /3,a n dg(θ1)=1 ,g (θ2)=2this variation is welfare improving
as long as g(θ3) > 9/2.
36We can summarize these three examples as follows. In each example we showed that welfare
could be improved relative to a static policy by raising inﬂation for high types and lowering inﬂation
f o rl o wt y p e ss oa st ok e e pe x p e c t e di n ﬂation constant. In the ﬁrst two examples this improved
welfare because there were suﬃciently few high types relative to low types so that we could raise the
inﬂation a lot for the types who valued it relatively more and lower only a little for the types who
valued it relatively less. In the third example, even though the distribution of types is uniform, the
high types valued inﬂation so much more than the lower types that by raising their inﬂation and
lowering it for the lower types we could raise welfare.
Appendix C: Implementation with an Inﬂation Cap
Here we prove that the equilibrium outcome in an economy with an inﬂation cap is the optimal
outcome of the mechanism design problem. We show this result formally using the following one-shot
game in which we drop time subscripts.
With an inﬂation cap of ¯ π in the current period, the problem of the monetary authority at
ag i v e nθ is as follows: Given aggregate wages x, choose money growth µ(θ) for this state θ to




An equilibrium of this one-shot game consists of aggregate wages x and a money growth
policy µ(·) such that (i)w i t hx given, µ(·) satisﬁes µ(θ) ≤ ¯ π,a n d( ii) x =
R
µ(θ)p(θ). We denote
the optimal choice of the monetary authority as µ∗(·;x, ¯ π). This notation reﬂects the fact that the
monetary authority is choosing a static best response to x given that its choice set is restricted by
¯ π,w h i c hw ec a l lt h einﬂation cap.
To implement the best equilibrium in the dynamic game, we choose ¯ π as follows. Whenever
the expected Ramsey policy is optimal, we choose the inﬂation cap to be
¯ π = µER. (55)
Whenever bounded discretion is optimal, we choose the cap ¯ π to be the money growth rate chosen
by the cutoﬀ type θ∗:
¯ π = µ∗(θ∗,x ∗) (56)
where x∗ is the equilibrium inﬂation rate with this level of bounded discretion.
Proposition 5. Assume (A1), (A2), and that the inﬂation cap ¯ π is set according to (55)
and (56). Then the equilibrium outcome of the one-shot game with the inﬂation cap for each period
coincides with the optimal equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game.
37Proof. To establish this result, we ﬁrst show that the monetary authority will choose the
upper bound ¯ π = µER when the expected Ramsey policy is optimal in the dynamic game. Note that
Proposition 3 implies that whenever the expected Ramsey policy is optimal, µER ≤ µ∗(θ;µER). Also,
recall that the single-crossing assumption (A1) implies that the best response is strictly increasing
in θ, so that (??)h o l d s .T h u s ,µ∗(θ;µER) ≤ µ∗(θ;µER) for all θ. Hence, at the expected Ramsey
policies and the associated inﬂation rate, all types want to deviate by increasing their inﬂation above
µER; hence, the constraint ¯ π = µER binds, and all types choose the expected Ramsey levels.
We next show that if bounded discretion is optimal in the dynamic game, then in the asso-
ciated static game with the inﬂation cap, all types choose the bounded discretion policies. For all
types θ ≤ θ∗, the policies under bounded discretion are simply the static best responses, and these
clearly coincide with those in the static game. For all types θ above θ∗, the policies under bounded
discretion are the static best responses of the θ∗ type, namely, µ∗(θ;x∗), where x∗ is the equilibrium
expected inﬂation rate under bounded discretion. Under assumption (A1), the static best responses
are increasing in the type, so that the best response of any type θ ≥ θ∗ is above µ∗(θ;x∗). Thus,
in the one-shot game with the inﬂation cap, the constraint (56) binds for such types. Thus, the
equilibrium outcomes of the two games coincide. Q.E.D.
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 4
The optimal policy with bounded discretion is found as the solution to the problem of choosing











θ∗ µ∗(θ∗;x)p(θ) dθ. (57)
Letting λ be the Lagrange multiplier on (57), the ﬁrst order conditions for θ∗ and x imply that the





















Using our functional forms and x =
R
µ(θ)p(θ)dθ we can simplify this derivative to
"Z ¯ θ













38We can show that, under (A2), this derivative is strictly decreasing in θ∗ as follows. Integration by
parts gives
Z ¯ θ
θ∗ (θ − θ∗)p(θ) dθ =
Z ¯ θ
θ∗(1 − P(θ))dθ,

















and this expression is clearly strictly decreasing in θ∗ under (A2).
The fact that (58) is strictly decreasing in θ∗ implies that there are three possible cases
characterizing the optimal policy with bounded discretion, depending on the value of U/α. In the
ﬁrst case, the derivative (58) is positive for all θ∗ and the solution is θ∗ = ¯ θ. Since the left side of
(58) equals zero when θ∗ = ¯ θ, this case occurs only when U/α =0 . As is clear, in this case, there
is no time inconsistency problem and the Ramsey policy is incentive compatible. In the second
case, the derivative (58) is negative for all θ∗ and the solution is θ∗ = θ. Since the derivative (58)
evaluated at θ∗ = θ reduces to −θ − U/α, this case occurs when U/α ≥− θ > 0. Note that in this
case, the optimal policy with bounded discretion speciﬁes a constant inﬂation rate and hence is
dominated, at least weakly, by the expected Ramsey policy with no discretion. Hence, we say that
in this case, the optimal policy has no discretion. In the third case, there is an interior θ∗ that sets
the derivative (58) to zero. This case occurs when 0 <U / α<−θ. Clearly, in this case, the value of
θ∗ characterizing the optimal degree of discretion is decreasing in U/α..
Finally, to complete the proof, we must show that when 0 <U / α<−θ, the optimal policy
with bounded discretion dominates the expected Ramsey policy. To do so, we use Proposition 3




<µ ER =0 .
The result then follows directly from Proposition 3.
Appendix E: The Role of the Constraint w(θ) ≤ ¯ w
Here we develop a highly stylized example (about traﬃc congestion) that illustrates the
importance of the constraint
w(θ) ≤ ¯ w (59)
in generating our result that the optimal policy is static. In the example we replace the constraint
(53) with the constraint
Z
w(θ)p(θ)dθ ≤ ¯ w. (60)
39and shows that the optimal mechanism diﬀers radically. To be concrete consider a mechanism design









and (60). One interpretation of this problem is as follows. A large number of people want to share a
r o a d .E a c hp e r s o nd i ﬀers in their desire to use the road, as indexed by the privately observed θ. Let
µ(θ) denote the time that type θ is allowed to drive. Let x denote the average traﬃc on the road,
as denoted by (62). Because of congestion people dislike higher average traﬃc( R is decreasing in
x).L e tw(θ) denote the toll to drive µ(θ). Constraint (60) is a budget constraint on tolls – where
¯ w is the money needed to operate the road, possibly zero.
It is easy to see that here the optimal w(θ) varies with θ. Speciﬁcally, it is possible to choose
w(θ) in such a way as to support the ﬁrst best. (Here we are assuming A1, so that the ﬁrst
best schedule for µ(θ) is upward sloping. To see this result drop the incentive constraint (61) and
solve for the ﬁrst best µ∗(θ), then use the local incentive compatibility condition to construct the
w∗(θ) function (up to the constant w∗(θ))t h a tm a k e sµ∗(θ) incentive compatible. Finally, choose
the constant w∗(θ) to satisfy (60).) Clearly, the answer to this problem is very diﬀerent from the
answer to our problem because here the optimal w(θ) varies with θ, while in ours it does not and
w(θ)=¯ w.
Note that the result that the ﬁrst best is incentive compatible is special to this functional





with U concave then we would have the standard tradeoﬀ between insurance (or redistribution) and
incentives.
How could we interpret our model and results in this road congestion context? Suppose that
it infeasible to use tolls and the only way to ration road use is to make individuals wait to get on the
road. Let t(θ) ≥ 0 be the amount of time someone has to wait to drive µ(θ) and let w(θ)= ¯ w−t(θ)
be the associated utility from waiting t(θ). Then t(θ) ≥ 0 is, of course, equivalent to w(θ) ≤ ¯ w. In
this context we get a very diﬀe r e n ta n s w e rt h e nw h e ny o uc a nu s et o l l s . U n d e rA1 and A2, the
o p t i m a ls c h e m ei st oh a v en oo n ew a i t( t(θ)=0 )and let everyone drive as much as they like subject
t oac a p ,µ(θ) ≤ µ∗.
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